Res Ipsa Loquitur in North Dakota by Crabb, John H. & Johannson, Kenneth F.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 38 Number 3 Article 1 
1962 
Res Ipsa Loquitur in North Dakota 
John H. Crabb 
Kenneth F. Johannson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Crabb, John H. and Johannson, Kenneth F. (1962) "Res Ipsa Loquitur in North Dakota," North Dakota Law 
Review: Vol. 38 : No. 3 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol38/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 





One of the dearest friends of plaintiffs in negligence is the
doctrine' called res ipsa loquitur. It is not of terribly classic
lineage. It is true that it seems to have been used from time
to time throughout the centuries when people felt like saying
in Latin "the thing speaks for itself," or, if more literal trans-
lation is preferred, "the thing itself speaks. ' 2 And it seems
that it was used in the field of contracts before it was in
torts.
3
But it was not until 1863 that the doctrine found a home
in the place where it has acquired its greatest renown and
pre-eminence. It was imported into the field of negligence in
the case of Byrne v. Boadle,4 and since then has flourished in-
creasingly as a fixture of the Anglo-American legal system.
Perhaps the most satisfying single definition of res ipsa
loquitur is that given in the projected second Restatement of
Torts. Its text is as follows: 5
"(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the
plaintiff is caused by negligence of the defendant when:
(a) The event is of a kind which ordinarily does
not occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) Other responsible causes, including the con-
duct of the plaintiff and third persons, are suffi-
ciently eliminated by the evidence, and
(c) The indicated negligence is within the scope
of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
"(2) It is the function of the court to determine
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1. It is found objectionable by some to refer to res ipsa loquitur as a
"doctrine". A dissenting judge, in excoriating res ipsa loquitur, said, "It
does not represent a doctrine, is not a legal maxim, and is not a rule."
Potomac Edison C. v. Johnson, 160 Md. 33, 152 Atl. 633 (1930). See also
Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241,
at 270-71 (1936).
2. For usages of the phrase running back to Roman times, see Hanni-
gan, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 6 Temp. L.Q. 376 (1932).
3. See Roberts v. Trenayne, Cr. Jac. 508 (1614).
4. 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 328D (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1961).
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whether the inference may reasonably be drawn by the
jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
"(3) It is the function of the jury to determine wheth-
er the inference is to be drawn in any case where differ-
ent conclusions may reasonably be reached."
It is to be noted that this involves an intimate intertwining
of substance and procedure. It was apparently in the belief
that the procedural aspect predominated that the first Re-
statement of Torts omitted all reference to res ipsa loquitur.6
It is readily apparent that res ipsa loquitur assists the
plaintiff by relieving him of the normal stringencies of the
burden of proof. Normally, he must prove the facts constitut-
ing the alleged negligence by a preponderance of the evidence,
as in any other civil case. 7 That is, he must show what the
defendant did, and wherein these acts of the defendant fell
below the standard of care owing by the defendant. This can
become a logical and physical impossibility where harm is
suddenly visited upon the plaintiff in such a way that the
conduct of the defendant immediately leading up to the inci-
dent is wholly beyond possible discovery by the plaintiff. Such
would be the case, for example, where the plaintiff is a pas-
senger on a train and asleep in a pullman berth when a wreck
occurs. For many cases of this type the rules of circumstan-
tial evidence may bail the plaintiff out of his dilemma.
The idea of circumstantial evidence is that from proof of
the existence of one proposition a further proposition may
be inferred, because of some kind of propinquity between the
two. s Thus, by proving what he does know-i.e., that certain
harm was visited upon him by the defendant-sometimes
from this fact some further fact may be permissibly inferred.
For example, where a bottle filled under pressure by the de-
fendant with a carbonated drink explodes in the plaintiff's
hand and injures him, the plaintiff can prove the fact of the
explosion, and from this fact the jury may be permitted to
infer the further fact that the defendant filled the bottle with
too strong a pressure charge for the strength of the bottle.
Such an inference relieves the plaintiff of the impossible bur-
den of proving that when this particular bottle was going
6. See the remarks of Dean Prosser, The American Law Institute,
PROCEEDINGS 1960, beginning at p. 209.
7. See generally, WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2498 (3d ed. 1940).
8. Id. § 25.
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through the defendant's bottling works certain excessive pres-
sures were injected into it.9
There are some who consider that res ipsa loquitur is not
distinguishable from the rules of circumstantial evidence.' 0
However, the doctrine does have vigorous supporters who up-
hold its separate integrity and deny its devouring by circum-
stantial evidence." Wherever the dividing line may be-and
this point will be discussed later-res ipsa loquitur is designed
as something over and beyond circumstantial evidence. After
the plaintiff has obtained all permissible mileage out of cir-
cumstantial evidence, res ipsa loquitur may still be on hand
to go with him that one extra mile that he needs. Even those
who deal with res ipsa loquitur distastefully out of the neces-
sity born from the fact of the widespread belief in it, con-
sider that it does not differ in principle from circumstantial
evidence. At least they seem to concede that it asserts itself
on the outer fringes of circumstantial evidence. But for the
existence of this doctrine, the circumstantiality in such cases
might be deemed stretched too thin to permit an inference.
In the controversy regarding the distinct identity of res
ipsa loquitur, various distinguishable marks have been urged.
Jaffe12 maintains that res ipsa loquitur necessarily involves
a presumption as opposed to the inference of circumstantial
evidence. But, at least from a standpoint of characterizing it
as an aid to the plaintiff, all would seem to agree that it is
an additional or more extreme assist than the most orthodox
and unquestioned circumstantial evidence would afford.
II
As in the case of any other invention, it took a while for
res ipsa loquitur to develop and spread beyond its status as
an exotic new device to its present near ubiquity in Anglo-
American law." Moreover it has only begun to make its ap-
9. Innumerable cases could be cited to illustrate exploding bottle prob-
lems. One such is Zentz v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 39 Cal.2d 436,
247 P.2d 344 (1952).
10. See especially Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
20 Minn. L. Rev. 241 (1936); and Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Reply to Professor
Carpenter, 10 So. Cal. L. Rev. 458 (1937); and Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur:
Tabula in Naufragio, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950). According to Seavey,
"There is nothing peculiar in the situations in which the phrase is used
except the paucity of evidence."
11. See especially Carpenter, Res Ipsa Loquitur: A Rejoinder to Profes-
sor Prosser 10 So. Cal. L. Rev. 467 (1937); and Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vin-
dicated, 1 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1951).
12. Jaffe, supra note 11.
13. But the gospel still hasn't taken hold everywhere. For example,
Michigan and South Carolina expressly reject it. See, e.g., Pattison v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Port Huron, 333 Mich. 253, 52 N.W.2d 688 (1952) and
Shepard v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 106 S.E.2d 381 (S.C. 1958).
[Vol. 38
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pearance in North Dakota. This is indicated by the fact that
an extensive search through standard sources has revealed
only a dozen cases that may be said to have purported to turn
on this doctrine. And three of these have occurred since 1959.
An indication of how North Dakota has generally ignored
the doctrine is the fact that out of approximately 3,500 en-
tries where the bulk of res ipsa loquitur cases are presumably
collected in the Sixth Decennial Digest of the West Publish-
ing Company, only one North Dakota case is to be found.
1
4
And quite surprising is the discovery that the only exploding
bottle case in North Dakota occurred only a very few years
ago, and in it there was not a single citation reported to an
exploding bottle case from another jurisdiction. 15 Exploding
bottle cases are among the classic or typical examples of res
ipsa loquitur, and reported cases on them elsewhere are al-
most myriad. The frequency of exploding bottle litigation is
further suggested by the fact that legal literature has devel-
oped on this specific point.le
The development of res ipsa loquitur as the plaintiff's
friend forms part of the policy of the law that emerged in
the nineteenth century to assist those injured by the relent-
less progress of industrialization and mechanization. For, al-
though res ipsa 'loquitur is not limited to such factual situa-
tions, they are most frequently involved one way or another.
Machines or their products are peculiarly liable to cause per-
sonal injuries and property damage in ways that the plaintiff
may have difficulty in explaining for purposes of fastening
fault upon the defendant, and res ipsa loquitur is designed to
assist plaintiffs thus unfortunately situated. A speculative
guess as to why the doctrine has been so slow to thrive in
North Dakota. is that the rural and agricultural complexion
of the state has made the need for such a doctrine less fre-
quent, and that hence the legal profession has not been stimu-
lated to think in terms of it. However, since res ipsa loquitur
is part of the mainstream of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
it seems inevitable that it should become a routine legal issue
in North Dakota, and the scanty evidence at hand suggests
this development.
14. This covers the period from 1946 to 1956, in Key Number 121 (2 and
3).
15. Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 N.W. 430 (N.D. 1959).
16. "E.g., Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U.L. Rev.
167 (1960).
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If that is true, it would be well to take a look at the present
status of res ipsa loquitur in North Dakota for purposes of
orientation as to its future development here. The doctrine has
tended to develop along jurisdictional lines, and a number of
articles have been written explaining its particular applica-
tion in various jurisdictions.
1 7
The North Dakota Court has made the observation that the
general rules of res ipsa loquitur are easily stated but the dif-
ficulty lies in its application to a particular factual situation,
so that the conclusions of the courts have been anything but
consistent."' The conditions necessary for the application of
the doctrine that most courts have followed heretofore have
generally been those promulgated by Wigmore, 19 and adopted
by Prosser, 20 and are usually stated thus: The accident must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence; it must be caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant;
it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribu-
tion on the part of the plaintiff. An additional condition that
the evidence must be more accessible to the defendant has not
won much support by the courts or our contemporary writ-
ers.21 No North Dakota case gives a full recital of the doctrine.
Where it has recognized res ipsa loquitur, the Court has dealt
expressly only with such parts of it as it saw to be truly in
issue. There has normally been the implication, however, that
it recognizes the authority of a generally accepted doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which would presumably approximate the
foregoing.
The first case in North Dakota to fall within range of
17. Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res lpsa Loquitur in California, 10 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 166 (1936); Davis, The California Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as
Affording an Inference of Negligence and not a Presumption of Law, 5 Air
L. Rev. 28 (1934); Prosser, lies Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. Rev.
183 (1949); Malone, lies Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Inference: a Discus-
sion of the Louisiana Cases, La. L. Rev. 70 (1941); Marshall, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in Louisiana, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 125 (1937); Farinhold, Res Ipsa
Loquitur, 10 Md. L. Rev. 337 (1949), discussing the doctrine in Maryland;
Okin, Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in New Jersey, 59 N.J.L.3. 193 (1936);
Katz, The New Interpretation of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 St. John's L. Rev.
117 (1943), discussing the doctrine in New York; Rosenthal, The Proce-
dural Effects of lies Ipsa Loquitur in New York, 22 Cornell L.Q. 39, 57
(1936); note, Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Virginia, 25 Va. L. Rev. 246
(1938); Karninoff, The Doctrine of lies Ipsa Loquitur in Washington, 13
Wash. L. Rev. 215 (1938).
18. Bergley v. Mann's, 99 N.W.2d 849, at 853 (N.D. 1959).
19. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
20. PROSSER, TORTS 199 (2d ed. 1955).




res ipsa loquitur was decided in 1903 and involved some stack-
ed hay and straw that was destroyed by the defendant's burn-
ing grain elevator.22 The only evidence of the cause of the fire
was an employee's speculation, on the condition of the elevator
equipment. The court, however, failed to consider the applica-
tion of the doctrine probably because the attorneys failed to
raise the issue. Significantly, the Court rejected recovery on
the theory that a verdict without direct proof would be spec-
ulative, resting on pure conjecture; they went on to state that
negligence must be proved.
The decision of the Balding case may have had its impact
for it was slightly more than a decade until the next res ipsa
loquitur cases were argued before the Court. These two cases,
decided in 1915 and 1918, undoubtedly were responsible for
the retarded development of res ipsa loquitur. Prosser con-
siders the language of the court in both of them to be so un-
certain as to make it impossible to say what is the position of
North Dakota with respect to the effect of res ipsa loquitur
as between creating a presumption, permitting an inference,
and shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.2
3
One of these cases was Wyldes v. Patterson 4 whose facts
offer an excellent illustration of the res ipsa loquitur situation.
The plaintiff, a laborer, was placing a wheelbarrow onto a
temporary elevator common to the construction industry. The
elevator was lowered while the wheelbarrow was being moved
onto the platform causing him to be drawn into the elevator.
The fall or sudden stop caused the cable to part, precipitating
the plaintiff to the ground, causing injuries. The injury and
the circumstances surrounding the occurrence were proved,
but the specific act or omission resulting in negligence was
unascertained. The jury was allowed to impute negligence to
the defendant contractor.
In Leiferman v. White,2 5 decided three years later, an em-
ployee was directed to go to the basement of an ice cream fac-
tory to sort potatoes. While there 'he came in contact with an
electric cord suspended from the ceiling. He received electrical
burns and other injuries. The court allowed recovery on the
theory of res ipsa loquitur. This case was clouded by the ad-
22. Balding v. Andrews, 12 N.D. 267, 96 N.W. 305 (1903).
23. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Ioquitur, 20 Minn. L.
Rev. 241 (1937), at 251-52.
24. 31 N.D. 282, 153 N.W. 630 (1915).
25. 40 N.D. 150, 168 N.W. 569 (1918).
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ditional element of contributory negligence which may have
caused the court some difficulty. Apparently from the evid-
ence of the case the plaintiff was forewarned of the existing
condition of the electrical appliances. In 1931, the ghost of
Byrne v. Boadle6 returned to haunt the North Dakota court
in the case of Bakken v. State.2 7 Here the plaintiff was a labor-
er inexperienced in work about a warehouse of a flourmill and
was temporarily employed to assist with an audit required by
law. While engaged in removing tiers of sacks piled in the
warehouse he sustained injuries occasioned by heavy sacks
falling from an adjoining tier and striking him. The evidence
showed that the tiers were constructed according to a stand-
ard method so that each tier would be self-sustaining. Al,
though the defendant asserted that due care was exercised
in the piling of the tiers, the Court held that the happening
of the accident tends to prove negligence in the piling of the
sacks. Apparently following earlier North Dakota precedent
without citing it, the Court allowed recovery in that the evi-
dence of the occurrence was sufficient to give rise to a pre-
sumption of fact.
28
Ten years later the Court completely rejected res ipsa loqui-
tur in Durick v. Winters2s where the plaintiff was injured
while a passenger in the defendant's taxicab which was in-
volved in a collision with another vehicle. In failing to recog-
nize the high degree of care required of common carriers as
distinguished from private conveyances, the Court ruled that
negligence is not imputed to the carrier simply because of the
accident. The case apparently turned on the fact that the plain-
tiff failed to show how the accident happened, and did not
sufficiently describe the circumstances surrounding the occur-
rence.30 It is submitted that because of the high degree of care
required by common carriers, the happening of the accident
itself could give rise to an inference to that slight degree of
negligence that would entail liability, and thus be sufficient
to take the case to the jury.31
26. 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex 1863).
27. 60 N.D. 127, 234 N.W. 513 (1931).
28. See note 52 Infra for an analysis of this holding.
29. 70 N.D. 592, 296 N.W. 744 (1941).
30. The court relied on Klingman v. Lowe's, Inc., 209 Minn. 449, 296
N.W. 528 (1941) which involved a collision between two automobiles,
neither a common carrier.
31. Capital Transit v. Jackson, 149 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
[Vol. 38
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After somewhat successfully coping with res ipsa loquitur
in those situations where it applied the doctrine, the Court in
1952 nullified what progress had been made before in the
case of Farmers Home Mutual Insurance Co. v. Grand Forks
Implement Co.2 The case arose out of a fire which started
in the plaintiff's shops from an unexplained source. One wit-
ness testified how the fire started but was unable to pinpoint
the cause and merely said that it started on a work bench
near some gasoline and electric apparatus. The plaintiff's case
had gone to the jury, which had found for the defendant. The
plaintiff asked for a judgment non obstante veredicto, or, in
the alternative, a new trial, on the theory that the verdict was
contrary to the evidence. Now, so far as res ipsa loquitur is
concerned, the plaintiff had gotten all the benefits he could
wish when he got the case to the jury. Although the court did
not employ the terminology of res ipsa loquitur in this con-
nection, it did say that, even in the absence of actual evidence
by the plaintiff as to the cause of the fire, "there is no ques-
tion but that the proof of a negligent act on the part of the de-
fendant is sufficient." Once the matter has gotten to the jury,
the plaintiff has overcome his major hurdle, but res ipsa loqui-
tur is not going to insure him success with the jury. In affirm-
ing the lower court, the Supreme Court could merely have
pointed to reasonable possibilities for the jury's having de-
cided for the defendant, and that it was a case upon which
reasonable minds could differ. However, the Court then in-
consistently went on to say that on the state of the evidence,
the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case, because
it was at least equally probable that the harm resulted from
a cause for which the defendant was not responsible." About
the only apparent purpose in such discussion by the Court
would be to let the plaintiff know that, not only is he not en-
titled to complain about the verdict, but he should never have
gotten to the jury in the first place, and a verdict should have
been directed against him. Out of the confusion of this case
about the only significance to be drawn for res ipsa loquitur
is the utterance by the Court of these magic words and reci-
32. 79 N.D. 177, 55 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
33. The court's analysis in terms of "prima facie case" interestingly sug-
gests the law of Michigan, which seems to use this as a substitute for rem
Ipma loquitur. However, the court referred to no Michigan cases. For a
statement of Michigan law on the point, see Pattison v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Port Huron, 333 Mich. 253, 52 N.W.2d 688 (1952).
1962]
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tation of parts of the doctrine by way of what can only be
properly regarded as dictum.
The latest of North Dakota cases, all decided in 1959, illus-
trate some of the classic res ipsa loquitur situations. An ex-
ploding bottle was the basis of applying the doctrine in Kuntz
v. McQuade.34 There a tavern keeper's son was injured when
a beer bottle which he had placed in a cooler exploded. The
evidence did not disclose the cause of the explosion and the
plaintiff put forth no theory of causation but relied on res ipsa
loquitur. Although the case went to the jury, recovery was
denied. We have already noted how singular it was that the
case failed to cite any other cases of exploding bottles, inas-
much as other jurisdictions have dealt with them repeated-
ly. 35
A case where a home was destroyed by fire apparently
caused by defendant's negligence in causing a break in the gas
line service while excavating for a sewer installation leans to-
ward the doctrine but was properly decided on pure circum-
stantial evidence without requiring the implementation of
res ipsa loquitur.36
Bergley v. Mann's31 was the last real res ipsa loquitur case
to be decided in North Dakota. It was an action for injuries
sustained by a pedestrian when struck by a false store front
which collapsed while the pedestrian was watching an auto
show. Although the trial court accepted res ipsa loquitur, the
case was remanded for new trial because of erroneous instruc-
tions.
Two malpractice cases which are pertinent have appeared in
North Dakota. Dolan v. O'Rourke,3 decided in 1928, involved
a dental patient who died while under an anesthetic admin-
istered by her dentist. The anesthetic was the same type that
was administered six months before treatment by the dentist.
The Court said that "res ipsa loquitur has no application in
malpractice cases" and that negligence cannot be inferred from
34. 95 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1959).
35. See supra at footnote 15.
36. Mischel v. Vogel, 96 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1959).
37. 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959).
38. 65 N.D. 416, 217 N.W. 666 (1928).
39. Stokes v. Dailey, 85 N.W.2d 745 (N.D 1957); the court said in ruling
on the defendant's directed verdict, "We cannot say under the facts of the
case that as a matter of law the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima
facie case of negligence or that there are not inferences of negligence to
be drawn from the evidence presented." For further developments of this
case, see Stokes v. Dailey, 97 N.W.2d 676 (N.D. 1959).
[Vol. 38
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the fact that the patient died while under an anesthetic be-
cause a bad result was not evidence of negligence.
Apparently the public policy of this period was against
holding medical practicioners liable for this type of treatment
in that it would discourage the "practice of the healing art,
for they would have to assume financial liability for nearly
all the ills that flesh is heir to." Nevertheless, the resulting
death would appear to be an extraordinary result of anesthe-
sia, particularly if administered by a dentist. An expert med-
ical witness may be necessary to indicate that the result would
not ordinarily happen under the same conditions without neg-
ligence. One other malpractice case has winked at res ipsa
loquitur but failed to make any progress due to the more press-
ing procedural specifications of error.
39
III
Until recently, the procedural status of res ipsa loquitur has
been in flux in that the courts were in disagreement whether
res ipsa loquitur operated to create a presumption or an infer-
ence of negligence. The difficulty may be traced back to the
formation of the doctrine in England at the time when the evi-
dentiary presumption was itself in infancy. Many early cases
of res ipsa loquitur apparently failed to grasp the significance
of distinguishing between a presumption and an inference
partly because the presumption was under development during
that period and partly because the presumption conceivably did
not have the general judicial force it has today.
4 °
Some early United States cases reveal that res ipsa loquitur
ran the gamit of interpretation. 41 New York was particularly
convinced that a presumption was raised by the doctrine
4 2
while other eastern courts preferred the inference theory.
43
One court went so far as to proclaim that negligence is never
40. See SIR W. S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol.
IX, p. 139 (1926); specific statutory presumptions were effected long before
res ipsa loquitur, e.g., a baby's cry was a presumption of life and seven
years of an absence was a presumption of death. And see Prosser, Res Ipsa
Loquitur in California, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 183 (1949) for a historical review of
res ipsa loquitur.
41. Mentser v. Armour, 18 Fed. 373 (8th Cir. 1883) (apparently not recog-
nizing the doctrine); Peer v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 215, 19 N.W. 961 (1884) (cir-
cumstantial evidence); Graham v. Bauland Co., 89 N.Y. Supp. 595 (1904)
(specific negligence); Morris v. Strobel & Wilken Co., 30 N.Y. Supp. 571
(1894) (prima facie negligence).
42. Rintoul v. N.Y. Cent. R. R., 17 Fed. 905 (2d Cir. 1883); Dahn v.
Dawson, 32 N.Y. Supp. 59 (1895); Adams v. Union Ry. 80 N.Y. Supp 264
(1903); Connor v. Koch, 85 N.Y. Supp. 93 (1903); Papazian v. Baumgartner,
97 N.Y. Supp. 399 (1906).
43. Strasburger v. Vogel, 103 Md. 85, 63 AtL 202 (1906); Ross v. Double
Shoals Cotton Mills, 140 N.C. 115, 52 S.E. 121 (1905).
19621
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presumed but that res ipsa loquitur is one mode of showing
negligence and that the negligence must be controverted or
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
44
Two previously mentioned North Dakota cases experienced
this same difficulty in distinguishing between a presumption
and an inference. In Wyldes v. Patterson- where the injury
resulted from an elevator accident, no evidence was offered by
the defendant to show sufficient strength of the cable or any
inspection of the cable. The court, implying an inference, that
"the occurrence of the injury, in the manner and under the
circumstances shown to exist, is of itself sufficient evidence of
the defect of the cable and the negligence of the defendant."
But further on in the opinion, the court said, "The breaking
of the cable under these circumstances was of itself sufficient
to raise a presumption of negligence." The court offers the
puzzled reader no clue as to how one is to choose between in-
ference and presumption in interpreting the case.
Leiferman v. White.6 where the plaintiff received an elec-
trical injury in the defendant's basement, apparently consider-
ed that only an inference was available to carry the case to
the jury. The court said ". .. (The) appliance in question was
shown to have been under the control of the defendants, and
the accident was such as would not have happened in the or-
dinary course of events had proper care been used. It is in
just such circumstances that the law allows the jury to draw
the inference of fact that the defendant was negligent. . .. Res
ipsa loquitur merely permits the jury to draw upon their ex-
perience in determining whether or not a given set of circum-
stances is consistent with the exercise of reasonable care on
the part of the defendant."
The later cases in North Dakota dealing with res ipsa loqui-
tur have taken the position that the doctrine operates to
create an inference. Although in Bakken v. State17 the court
may have erroneously applied res ipsa loquitur they did con-
clude that negligence could reasonably be inferred from the
facts of the case. Our most recent decision unequivically per-
44. Wood v. Wilmington City Ry., 21 Del. 369, 64 Atl. 246 (1905).
45. 31 N.D. 282, 153 N.W. 630 (1915).
46. 40 N.D. 150, 168 N.W. 569 (1918).
47. 60 1LD. 127, 234 N.W. 513 (1931); in Farmers Home Mut. I. Co. v.
Grand Forks Implement Co., 79 N.D. 177, 55 N.W.2d 315 (1952) the court
said that, ... if the evidence of circumstances will permit a reasonable in-
ference of the alleged cause of injury and exclude other equally reasonable
inferences of other causes, the proof is sufficient to take the case to the
jury ...."
[Vol. 38
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mits an inference and should make North Dakota's position
clear. An excellent opinion by Judge Morris in Bergley v.
Mann's,45 quoted that much cited U. S. Supreme Court case of
Sweeney v. Erving49 thus: "Res ipsa loquitur means that the
facts of the occurrence warrant an inference of negligence ... "
Therefore, an inference of negligence was created which the
jury might accept or reject even after any explanation offered
by the defendant.
An interesting point in applying an inference or presump-
tion was raised in Kuntz v. McQuade.50 The court allowed the
parties to stipulate that res ipsa loquitur should create an in-
ference, not a presumption. The court allowed this stipulation
although it is difficult to understand how the parties may
stipulate with regard to rules of evidence. 51 However, the
court reached the conclusion that inference is the proper
theory. If presumptions were to be the theory, the plaintiff
should be allowed a directed verdict if the defendant has done
nothing to rebut the evidentiary presumption.
One other difficulty beyond the element that the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur is dependent upon the factual situa-
tion of each case52 is distinguishing a res ipsa loquitur case
from a purely circumstantial case. Although the problem may
be largely academic, it will have its practice{l ramifications.
Actually the distinction is a very subtle one. In most instances,
circumstantial evidentiary facts must lead to and establish a
proposition which of itself has a relative probative value. The
proposition can be supported by an infinite synthesis of testi-
onial assertions and circumstances.5 3 A more positive approach
is employed by the use of circumstantial evidence to support
a preconceived proposition or propositions with facts other
than the principal fact. Another distinction may be made on
the relative predictability of conceivable propositions and in-
ferences. The use of circumstantial evidence is limited by the
predictability of possibilities and requires that the proponent
take a more affirmative stand in the proof of his case; where
48. 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959).
49. 228 U.S. 233 (1913). The case further quoted PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 43 (2d ed. 1955) on the weight of authority regarding Pem ipsa
loquitur as nothing more than a form of circumstantial evidence creating
an inference.
50. 95 N.W. 430 (N.D. 1959).
51. The court relied on Casey v. First Nat'l Bank, 20 N.D. 211, 126 N.W.
1011 (1910) where a stipulation was allowed on a theory of equitable title
to grain. This case has absolutely no application to rules of evidence.
52. Bakken v. State, 60 N.D. 127, 234 N.W. 513 at 516 (1931).
53. See generally, WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 25 (3d ed. 1940).
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in the res ipsa loquitur case the plaintiff is allowed an infin-
ite number of avenues to reach the jury by virtue of a negative
or lacuna in proof; i. e., he shows that the event happened,
therefore the defendant must have been negligent, thereby
circumventing the normal chain of proof. Yet there are many
conceivable factual situations where either res ipsa loquitur
and circumstantial evidence may be utilized to obtain the de-
sired result, and by the same token some courts have adopted
the wrong procedural device.
5 4
Two North Dakota cases illustrate the difficulty in this area
and also illuminate the distinction that should be made. In
Mischel v. Vogel-- the plaintiff's home was destroyed by fire
allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence in causing a
break in the gas service line while excavating for a sewer in-
stallation. The court said, "While negligence must be proved
and will never be presumed merely from proof of the accident,
... negligence proximately causing the plaintiff's damage like
any other fact, may be proved by circumstantial evidence."
In this case the Court speaks in terms of circumstantial
evidence and not res ipsa loquitur. There is only one proposi-
tion, that the defendants caused the break in the gas line,
shown by the facts that the pipe was bent, a large indentation
was discovered, and the ground was saturated with natural
gas from the point where the gas line was bent to the founda-
tion of the house. From these asserted facts and the circum-
stances that the house caught fire, we may propose that the
defendant negligently caused the break in the gas line and was
therefore responsible for the plaintiff's damage.
An older case, Bakken v. State,5 6 involved a warehouse labor-
er who was injured by flour sacks falling from a nearby tier
of sacks. The Court held that res ipsa loqittur applied; the
evidence of the occurrence was sufficient to raise a presump-
tion of fact (or inference) for the consideration of the jury.
This is true, but the inference was undoubtedly reached by
the use of circumstantial evidence rather than res ipsa loqui-
tur. There are really only two preconceived inferences. Al-
though the Court only suggested one possible inference of
54. Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 35 N.J. Super 319, 114 A.2d 278 (1955); Peer
v. Ryan, 54 Mich. 215, 19 N.W. 961 (1884).
55. 96 N.W.2d 233 (N.D 1959); the court also gave credence to an old
saying, "There is no man who would not accept dog tracks in the mud
against the sworn testimony of a hundred eyewitnesses that no dog passed
that way."
56. 60 N.D 127, 234 N.W. 513 (1931).
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negligence, that the sacks were improperly stacked, there is
another, that the sacks were improperly filled, then stacked,
so as to cause the tier to tilt dangerously and collapse at the
slightest jar. This additional supposition is inserted not as a
technical triviality, but to illustrate the narrowness of pos-
sible inferences arising out of such a situation. We contend
that a res ipsa loquitur situation must produce a variety of
inferences possible, each one suggesting negligence on the
part of the defendant.
The only significant effect this distinction would have is
in the actual trial of the case. It would certainly affect the
plaintiff for it would be necessary for him in a circumstantial
case to establish the propositions by testimentary assertions
and circumstances. By employing res ipsa loquitur, it is only
necessary for the plaintiff to prove the occurrence and the
circumstances surrounding the occurrence and allow the jury
to infer how the defendant was negligent. Technically, the
burden of proof never shifts from the plaintiff.57 And though
the defendant is rarely going to be exposed to an adverse di-
rected verdict for failure to submit evidence controverting the
plaintiff's evidence, normally he does offer such evidence.
This task of the defendant's is apt to be more onerous when
res ipsa loquitur applied to the plaintiff's case; for unless the
defendant is able to point to some cause extraneous to him as
being responsible for the happening, he will probably feel
obligated to undertake the difficult and boundless task of prov-
ing the negative proposition that he was not negligent or fail-
ing in the standard of care required of him. This can be par-
ticularly frustrating because no amount of such evidence, re-
gardless of its quality, can ever conclusively convince the jury
that the defendant was not somehow at fault, because the ac-
tual happening itself remains unexplained. But in a circum-
stantial evidence case the issue is narrowed down to about one
or two specific propositions. This gives the defendant an easier
time of it, because he must only resist those specific proposi-
tions put forth by the plaintiff.
The summation and the instructions would also vary signifi-
cantly in the type of method used in proving negligence. In a
circumstantial case, the plaintiff would submit that if the jury
57. Bergley v. Mann's, 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959).
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does infer either proposition A or proposition B they are bound
to find that the defendant was negligent. However, in a res
ipsa loquitur case, he would only have to argue that if the
occurrence is one which in the ordinary course of things does
not happen without negligence, the jury may infer negligence
of the defendant. Conceding that there are many other fac-
tors which must be dealt with,58 the above serves as an illus-
tration of some practical distinctions between pure circum-
stantial evidence and res ipsa loquitur.
IV
In view of North Dakota's limited experience with res ipsa
loquitur to date, many of the refinements of the doctrine have
not yet been developed. On the substantive side, of example,
there are necessarily only a few types of factual situations
that the court has been called upon' to characterize as being
or not being within the coverage of res ipsa loquitur. While
there is no one thing or circumstance which is automatically
either within or without the scope of res ipsa loquitur, never-
theless some things by their nature tend to raise at least the
issue of the doctrine.
To say the issue is raised, of course, does not necessarily
means that res ipsa loquitur is decisive of the case, and per-
haps closer scrutiny will reveal the case to properly turn on
circumstantial evidence. But among those things commonly
suggesting res ipsa loquitur, the North Dakota Court has had
occasion to deal with an elevator,59 a defective electric cord,6 0
an exploding bottle,61 a broken gas line, 62 the collapse of a
building, 63 a taxicab collision,6 4 and, at least to a degree, mal-
practice. 65 And, in the best classical tradition of res ipsa loqui-
tur, even if not among the most commonly invoked situations,
the Court has also welcomed the falling sack of flour into the
club.6 6 Fires as such are probably not a "thing" characteris-
tically raising an issue of res ipsa loquitur, but nevertheless
the court flirted with the doctrine in two cases. In one 7 the
58. See I.e., notes 5 and 37 supra.
59. Wyldes v. Patterson, 31 N.D. 282, 153 N.W. 630 (1915).
60. Leiferman v. White, 40 N.D. 150, 168 N.W. 569 (1918).
61. Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 N.W.2d (N.D. 1959).
62. Mischel v. Vogel, 96 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1959).
63. Bergley v. Mann's, 99 N.W.2d 849 (N.D. 1959).
64. Durick v. Winters, 70 N.D. 592, 296 N.W. 744 (1941).
65. Stokes v. Dailey, 85 N.W.2d (N.D. 1957); Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D.
416, 217 N.W. 666 (1928).
66. Bakken v. State, 60 N.D. 127, 234 N.W. 513 (1931).
67. Balding v. Andrews, 12 N.D. 267, 96 N.W. 305 (1903).
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court denied recovery in a manner seemingly oblivious to the
whole concept of res ipsa loquitur; in the other G the Court
went in so many ways at once on res ipsa loquitur, that it
scarcely made much impact as to its relation to fires, or any-
thing else.
Still untouched are a number of typical situations, such as
airplane crashes, certain types of automobile accidents, rail-
roads and other common carriers, and industrial machinery.
As we indicated above, the Court has never undertaken a full
statement of the doctrine, but apparently agrees with its gen-
erally accepted substantive content, as formulated by leading
writers.69 The Court has not always been at pains to disting-
uish pure res ipsa loquitur from circumstantial evidence cases.
The court applied res ipsa loquitur in Bakken v. State. How-
ever, circumstantial evidence would have done the job quite
adequately. From the fact of the flour sack having fallen on
the -plaintiff, about the only two possible inferences of fact,
which would create liability on the defendant, were that the
sacks had been improperly filled or improperly stacked. There
is no necessity to ask the jury to make a leap to a general in-
ference of negligence, without specification as to inferred facts
upon which negligence would be predicated.
But in Mischel v. Vogel the Court gave an excellent exposi-
tion of the theory of circumstantial evidence, and showed a
fine sense of discrimination in refraining from any mention
of res ipsa loquitur. From the fact that the defendant's em-
ployees were working and digging near the gas pipe, the jury
was allowed to infer the fact that they broke it, and on this
fact the defendant's liability could be founded. There was no
need to call upon a generalized inference of negligence in order
to permit recovery, as the only significant fact in issue not
proven by direct testimony was whether the defendant's em-
ployees broke the pipe.
On the procedural side, the main problem of res ipsa loqui-
tur has been whether it is to give rise to, an inference as op-
posed to a presumption of negligence. We have noted how in
ealier years the Court seemed to be in distressing, if not hope-
less, confusion between these two alternatives.7 0 But the
68. Farmers Home Mut. I. Co. v. Grand Forks Implement Co., 79 N.D.
177, 55 N.W.2d 315 (1952).
69. Supra notes 19 and 20.
70. Supra notes 41 and 42.
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Court has recently spoken clearly on this particular point in
the case of Bergley v. Mann's, and stated unequivocally that
the procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur is to create a permis-
sible inference of negligence. The defendant's store front had
collapsed on the plaintiff, and the Court said: "The applica-
tion of the rule of res ipsa loquitur under the circumstances
presented in this case created an inference of negligence which
the jury might accept or reject. . . ." It may seem somewhat
unfortunate that the Court did not cite any earlier res ipsa
loquitur cases in North Dakota in order to dispel explicitly
the confusion their unrepudiated authority may continue to
cause. However, at least the Court made a deliberate choice
of an inference over a presumption, because in its quotations
from Prosser's works the Court showed it was aware of the
possibility of applying a presumption theory like a few juris-
dictions do.
It may be supposed that the new Restatement of Torts will
have considerable influence in determining the future shape
and direction of res ipsa loquitur, and give it additional con-
sistency and cohesiveness from one jurisdiction to the next. If
that is true, it would seem desirable for North Dakota to ac-
cept the new Restatement's version of it.71 The new Restate-
ment's position represents the considered opinion of leading
authorities on the subject after a thorough study of its devel-
opment and application.7 2 If the holding in the Bergley case
be accepted as establishing inference as the procedural rule
in North Dakota for res ipsa loquitur, there would appear to be
nothing in North Dakota's jurisprudence thus far that would
impede its following in the future the guide lines provided by
the new Restatement.
V
Other jurisdictions may reveal what lies in store for North
Dakota and what direction the Court will take in deciding
future res ipsa loquitur cases.
While North Dakota has not yet come to terms with the
application of res ipsa loquitur to malpractice cases, more and
more of these cases have felt the touch of res ipsa loquitur,
particularly in California. 73 The question of the defendant's
71. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5.
72. See The American Law Institute, PROCEEDINGS 1960, at 209.




duty has become exceedingly important and in order to estab-
lish what duty was owed, expert testimony generally must be
used to establish negligence. As an example, the result reach-
ed in Dolan v. O'Rourke,74 would be quite different if decided
today.
Yet, in another medico-legal area, the trend is away from
the use of res ipsa loquitur in cases dealing with X-ray burns.15
Prosser suggests that this might be due to idiosyncracy of the
patient or that the burn was unavoidable. We suggest as still
another factor that in radium and X-ray treatment, the pa-
tient assumes the risk of burn and is generally fully cognizant
of the dangers of radiation.
Airplane accidents offer an excellent illustration how a
particular fact situation may support res ipsa loquitur. When
air travel was still an infant, the courts thought of it as an
ultra-hazardous activity, applying the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity. Res ipsa loquitur had little application to early air travel
as common experience would not indicate that the occurrence
would not happen in the absence of negligence and the element
of assumed risk was present.16 However, as air travel became
more reliable, the airplane was not regarded as an inherently
dangerous mode of transportation. Therefore airplane crashes
do not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence.
7
1
Automobile accidents which are not witnessed are parti-
cularly susceptible to res ipsa loquitur. The most frequently
recurring situations in which the doctrine is applied to auto-
mobile accidents are a single vehicle leaving the road by it-
self,18 or a head-on crash between two oncoming vehicles.
7 9
Applicable in other automobile situations as well, 0 these two
situations fall into the category that in the ordinary course of
operation an accident would not happen had the person in con-
trol exercised proper care, and in the absence of any explana-
74. 56 N.D. 416, 217 N.W. 666 (1928).
75. PROSSER, TORTS § 43 (2d ed. 1955) and see comment, 40 Colum. L.
Rev. 161 (1940).
76. Davis, The California Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Affording an
Inference of Negligence and Not a Presumption of Law, 5 Air L, Rev. 28
(1934).
77. See Goldin, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Aviation Law, 18 So. Cal. L. Rev.
15-40; 124-53 (1944).
78. Worsham v. Duke, 220 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1954)' Wisconsin Telephone
Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis. 304, 41 N.W.2d 268 (1949).
79. Kempfer v. Bois, 255 Wis. 312, 38 N.W.2d 483 (1948).
80. Comparative negligence and a presumption of due care raised for
the benefit of one killed in an accident are additional considerations in
automobile cases. Callahan v. Van Galder, 3 Wis.2d 654, 89 N.W.2d 210
(1958). And see James and Dickson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law.
63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950).
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tion, an inference arises that the injury was caused by want
of care. Proof of negligence in these situations may be estab-
lished by two possible means. One is circumstantial evidence
in the rare instance where the physical facts found following
the accident may support an inference of some specific negli-
gent act or omission."' The second and more frequent situa-
tion is one where the facts will allow the application of the
docrine of res ipsa loquitur.82
Probably the most significant development is the increasing
use of expert testimony which will permit the courts to make a
finer and more just adjudication of res ipsa loquitur situa-
tions . 3 It is extremely useful where a layman cannot from his
limited practical experience say that a thing would not hap-
pen in the ordinary course of events. Due to a more specialized
and complex technological society, the use of expert testimony
will be of aid to plaintiffs and defendants alike where a prop-
erly qualified expert can say what is an ordinary happening
in the not so usual course of events. The plaintiff would be
quick to recognize the advantages, but an expert may also
indicate non-negligence in a particular case although ordin-
arily there would be negligence.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is by no means static and
like all other areas of the law is subject to change and devel-
opment. Although reared in mystery and confusion, the doc-
trine serves a very necessary function to insure justice.
"Let us think of jurisprudence for a moment as a science
of social engineering, having to do with that part of the whole
field which may be achieved by the ordering of human rela-
tions through the action of politically organized society."
ROSCOE POUND, Interpretation of Legal History 152 (1923).
81. This may be accomplished by the employment of an automotive
crash expert who Is able to reconstruct the accident by scientific methods.
By observing the twisted wreckage, the expert may suggest excessive
speed, or one driver was on the wrong side of the road, or the accident was
due to a specific mechanical failure found to have existed before the acci-
dent. These elements involve but one proposition to be accepted or rejected
by the jury.
82. Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (bulldozer
operation); Budd v. Crimm, 110 N.W.2d 321 (Ia. 1961) (rear-end collision);
McLaughlin v. Lasater, 129 Cal. App. 2d 432, 277 P.2d 41 (1954) (mechanical
defect), Contra, Faulk v. Soberanes, 14 Cal. Rptr. 545, 363 P.2d 293 (1961)
(collision with a tree to avoid oncoming automobile); Cohen v. Hirsch, 230
Minn. 512, 42 N.W.2d 51 (1950) (skidding automobile).
83. See The Use of Expert Evidence in Res Ipsa Loquitur, 106 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 731 (1958).
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